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1ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to verify whether we are moving towards a new paradigm of the network
energy industry (electricity and natural gas), based on a wide decentralisation of the energy supply.
We do this by comparing the social benefits of decentralised and centralised models, simulating
“ideal” situations in which any source of allocative inefficiencies is eliminated. This comparison
focuses on assessing internal and external benefits. The internal benefits are calculated by
simulating the optimal prices of the electricity and gas inputs. The external benefits are estimated by
applying the “ExternE” methodology, one of the most recent and accurate approaches in this field.
The paper rejects the hypothesis that we are moving towards a new paradigm and points out how
the considerable interest in the deployment of distributed generation (DG) is probably due to market
distortions, in some cases, enforced by market reforms. In this respect, the paper reflects upon the
real effectiveness of such reforms as well as the overall efficiency of the environmental policies
focusing on the reduction of green-house gas emissions.
JEL classification: L51, L94, L95, O34, Q20, Q30.
Keywords: Distributed Generation, Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, Energy Economics,
Environmental Economics, Technological Change.
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1. Introduction
 The restructuring and privatisation of electricity and gas industries is occurring world-wide
and clearly confirms the general tendency to abandon the traditional organisation based on the
operation of large integrated firms.
Nevertheless, the impact of the market reforms in terms of social welfare is not clear yet.
Although several analysis have been proposed in this field, the results do not converge. In the
meanwhile, some recent dramatic events (i.e. the California energy crisis and the collapse of Enron)
and some profound changes introduced in those countries firstly promoting liberalisation processes
have increased the number of those who question the real benefits of such an organisational change.
However, while this issue is still being debated, technological change and innovation offer us
the prospect of revolutionary new scenarios. In particular, the performance of the small power
technologies (the reciprocating engine, gas turbine, and fuel cells) has improved remarkably over
the last decade. This has aroused the interest of operators, regulators and legislators in distributed
generation (DG), namely, the integrated or stand-alone use of small, modular power generation
close to the point of consumption as an alternative to large power generation and electricity
transport over long distances (figure 1).
Distributed generation can provide several benefits which can be divided into two categories.
The first includes the so-called structural benefits whose existence does not depend on how markets
are organised: avoided electricity transmission costs; reduced energy costs through combined heat
and power generation1; etc.. The second category includes the so-called market-related benefits
whose extent depends on how markets are organised: decreased exposure to electricity price
volatility; improved power quality; increased power reliability; etc..
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 Customer proximity greatly increases the potential for cogeneration. The high costs of transporting heat even over
short distances make large-scale cogeneration unattractive.
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4In addition to these advantages, distributed generation can be attractive for another reason. Several
authors think that its deployment could promote a technological change similar to what occurred in
the telecommunication sector.
In fact, it allows customers and producers to bypass the local supply network, like mobile and
satellite technologies, whose development has had a radical (positive) impact on the organisation
and structure of the telecommunications industry. This similarity is probable exaggerated but it
would be foolish to ignore its effect on raising policymakers’ and operators’ interest in DG social
benefits and economic viability.
However, the realisation that DG could provide some benefits is only the starting point of our
analysis. In order to verify whether we are moving towards a new paradigm, we first have to
measure the extent of these benefits. This requires comparing centralised and decentralised supplies
in terms of social welfare in order to identify the overall range of DG social competitiveness.
The article is organised in the following way. Section 2 illustrates the general approach and
main assumptions of the analysis. Section 3 compares centralised and decentralised models in terms
of energy efficiency, the first rough performance indicator. Section 4 sets out the methodology
adopted to evaluate the  internal and external benefits of distributed generation. Internal benefits are
calculated by simulating optimal prices of the electricity and natural gas inputs. Moreover, in order
to consider the territorial effects (i.e. «customer density» variability) and simulate geographic
marginal costs, two econometric models of electricity and gas distribution costs are developed. The
external costs and benefits of both centralised and decentralised systems are assessed by using the
“ExternE” methodology, one of the most accurate approaches recently developed in this field. In
this respect, we take care to separate local-regional and global effects. In fact, this distinction is
useful to isolate the impact of statistical and political uncertainty, which mainly regards to global
warming cost estimations. Section 5 focuses on fully decentralised models. The results are
presented in terms of density and cumulative probability distributions and take into account both the
territorial parameter dispersion and the uncertainty of external cost estimates. The section
subsequently analyses the robustness of these results by verifying their sensitivity to the variability
of some structural parameters considered fixed in the base case. Section 6 analyses the case of
hybrid models in order to see whether we are facing a “convex” world, that is, whether there is an
internally solution which is better than the fully centralised and decentralised models. Section 7
includes some observations regarding two relevant topics related to the DG issue: the impact of
energy market reforms and the effectiveness of the environmental policies focusing on the reduction
of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. Section 8 deals with the possible impact of incoming
technological innovations, with particular focus on the potential effect of the use of fuel cells. The
final section summarises the main results of the paper.
 Related literature. The topic of this paper ties in with the main research fields of
microeconomic theory: pricing regulations of public utilities, the relationship between technological
change and market organisation, the economic evaluation and internalisation of externalities and the
use of cost-benefit analysis to assess the impact of market reforms.
As regards pricing regulation, we have analysed the traditional literature on peak-load pricing
methodology originally set out by Steiner (1957) and Boiteaux (1956) and later fully developed by
other authors (see Pressman, 1970 and Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986). We have made very few
5incursions in the world of non-linear tariffs. Worth mentioning is the study by Wilson (1993) which
gives a broad overview of the general theory and the one by Electricité de France-Service des
Etudes Economique Générales (1979) which provides a useful  application of marginal cost pricing
to the case of electricity supply.
Since distributed generation is a sort of bypass technology involving competition between
electricity and natural gas utilities, we have also referred to the literature on cream skimming,
bypass and regulated competition. In this field, Curien, Jullien, and Rey (1998) explore optimal
pricing regulation under bypass competition in the case of telecommunications and Laffont and
Tirole (1993) focus on the problems of asymmetric information between regulator and operators.
Based on the original works by Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig
(1982), Brauetigam (1984) analyses the case in which even bypass technology is regulated, that is,
when bypass involves competition between two natural monopolies. These contributions help us
understand whether hybrid solutions (in our case, centralised and decentralised systems operating
together) might be the social optimum.
As regards the relationship between technological change and market organisation, distributed
generation occupies a precise place in the literature on energy and public utilities economics.
Several papers deal with this topic and the Energy Journal has recently published a special issue
with several interesting contributions. Some are specific (Sharma and Bartels, 1997; Either and
Mount, 1997; Morse, 1997) and others more generic (Pfeifenberger et. al., 1997). The authors give
a moderately optimistic picture of DG development and emphasise the importance of industry and
price unbundling in determining its economic viability, at least in some specific market niches.
However, even in this case, the results of the analysis are only partially useful for our purposes. In
fact, they focus on private competitiveness while this paper takes a rather different approach since it
is based on overall social value and not only on private economic viability.
With regard to social cost-benefit analysis we have referred to the methodology developed by
Jones, Tandon and Volgesang (1990) and the several applications by Newbery and Pollitt (1997)
and Newbery (2001). Although this methodology aims to evaluate privatisation processes, it is also
useful to investigate the social impact of industry restructuring or, as in our case, technological and
organisational alternatives.
Since distribution costs (of both electricity and natural gas) affect DG benefits, we also analysed
the related literature which can be divided into two groups of contributions. The one emphasising
economies of scale (Roberts, 1986; Nelson and Primeaux, 1988, Salvanes and Tjoota, 1994) and the
one emphasising the importance of economies of density (Filippini, 1998; Folloni, 2001; Gullì,
2000). This paper mainly refers to second group.
References to external cost literature need to be more detailed, not only because this is
particularly extensive but also because the debate on this topic is still controversial. Several authors
in fact question the reliability of the methodologies developed to estimate the monetary value of
external environmental effects. Their arguments mainly focus on the considerable uncertainty of
estimations (mainly about global warming) which would make them less effective in informing
environmental policies. These authors notably include Stirling (1997) who provides some
interesting arguments to support his thesis. However, we will try to demonstrate that such
scepticism is perhaps exaggerated and that external cost methodologies can be very useful despite
the considerable uncertainty regarding specific categories of environmental damage. In this paper
6we use the “ExternE” approach which is one of the most recent and reliable methodologies in this
field. It was developed by a group of leading European and US research centres with the financial
support of the EU (DG XII). Valette (1995) briefly describes the methodological approach and
reports the results when it was first implemented. More detailed information regarding this
methodology and its application are reported in a series of reports published by the European
Commission (European Commission, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 1998a,
1998b).
Finally, we should mention some important specific contributions on distributed generation
provided by non-academic institutions and consulting companies including the reports by NARUC
(National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners) prepared in the framework of The
Regulatory Assistance Project (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001) and the detailed documents of the US
Department of Energy prepared by Arthur D. Little (1998, 1999, 2000). These contributions have
been precious sources of information and very helpful in understanding some technical and
economic issues related to distributed generation deployment.
2. General approach
 DG raises several economic issues for regulators and legislators: What is the real social
benefit of distributed generation? Is this benefit sufficient to promote a transition towards a widely
decentralised organisation? In other words, is DG the new paradigm of the network energy
industry? Searching for a paradigm implies some basic methodological choices and assumptions
which can be explained by answering the following questions.
First, what should our evaluating criterion be? The choice is quite simple. Since we are
searching for a social paradigm, the criterion should be a social welfare comparison (between
centralised and decentralised supplies) and the related analytical tool a cost-benefit analysis.
Second, what kinds of situations should be analysed: “ideal” or real situations? In this respect,
we should not be concerned with the real world where several possible sources of distortions
(market power, energy taxation and inefficient regulated prices) could give a false representation of
DG social value. Therefore, “ideal” situations should be investigated and, consequently, any sources
of allocative inefficiencies eliminated. This requires, on the one hand, simulating optimal prices of
the electricity and gas inputs and, on the other, removing the “incompleteness of the markets” due
to environmental external costs.
Third, which category of DG benefits should be considered? We believe that, since we are
dealing with “ideal” situations, only the structural benefits should be taken into account, excluding
benefits and advantages due to specific market organisations. The particularly controversial case of
price volatility in the power sector can help us explain this choice. High price volatility can be due
to market power and/or supply scarcity.
In the case of market power, distributed generation reduces the risk of price volatility because it
increases the elasticity of demand. Nevertheless, since this advantage is the result of a market
distortion (and as such is not a benefit in absolute terms), it must not take into account when we
deal with an “ideal” framework.
7The case of the supply scarcity is less clear from this point of view. Divergences between supply
and demand can, in fact, create price fluctuations in addition to the effects of market power. We
should therefore ask ourselves whether such divergences are possible in “ideal” situations. On the
one hand, perfectly competitive systems should provide optimal price signals to operators (in order
to plan their investments) and customers (in order to adjust their consumption decisions) so that
price volatility is absent or at least minimised. On the other hand, in an optimal-regulated
monopolistic market, the firm should be able to perfectly adapt its offer to demand. But again price
fluctuations, even though minimised, might not be completely eliminated because of the
unavoidable uncertainty regarding the evolution of demand over time. In conclusion, although price
fluctuations are bound to exist even in “ideal” situations, they are certainly lower than those that
occur in real situations. This means we can legitimately disregard them and consider in our analysis
only DG structural benefits from combined heat and power generation (explicitly) and avoided
electricity transmission costs (implicitly).
Fourth, what kinds of applications and technologies should be examined? Since the simulation
must be representative of large potential DG deployment, we should not analyse specific
applications or technologies which are not significant of a paradigmatic change (i.e. renewable
energy sources). We therefore have to deal with fossil fuel plants (especially natural gas fired
technologies2). As regards the applications, we will proceed as follows. We will first deal with
applications for residential uses (i.e. the largest customer category3) and “isolated” solutions (see
the next paragraph), in order to simulate fully decentralised models of supply (in this case,
centralised supply and distributed generation are analysed separately: a fully centralised model
versus a fully decentralised model). Subsequently, we will analyse “open” solutions and “isolated”
solutions applied to customers larger than the residential ones (the case analysed will be a
hospital4), in order to consider hybrid models (in which distributed generation and centralised
supply co-exist).
Finally, since DG costs depend on several exogenous parameters (i.e. structure of the territory,
natural gas price, geographic position, etc.), how can we obtain a reliable measure of its social
benefits? In this respect it is obvious that it is impossible to provide a single value of DG social
benefit but that a range of variability must be proposed. This means that our estimating model
should be as flexible as possible in order to take into account the variability of the exogenous
parameters. Since this variability can be very high it would be very difficult (and superfluous) to
examine all the possible combinations of values. Our analysis will therefore focus on the best and
worst cases.
The exogenous variables affecting DG costs and benefits can be divided into three categories.
The first includes variables which change significantly over time (i.e. natural gas price). In order to
consider the impact of their variability on DG benefits we will carry out a sensitivity analysis. The
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 Since DG plants are generally located in urban areas, natural gas is the most appreciated fuel because of its low
environmental impact compared to other fossil fuels.
3
 This kind of application represents a conservative case involving a low ratio of heat and electricity consumption. In
fact, although industrial customers are more favourable to CHP, it would  not be representative of a  paradigmatic
change.
4
 We do not take into consideration applications which involve power plant capacity higher than 10 MW, since this
threshold power generation is considered centralised (generation which does not bypass the electricity transport grid).
8second category includes variables which can change over “space” (i.e. electricity and gas
distribution costs). Their impact will be considered by estimating density distributions (assessed
through econometric models) and directly using them in the model. The last category includes those
factors that cannot be expressed as parametric variables. The most important is the geographic
location of the plants which considerably affects the environmental impact of the fuel cycles. This
effect could be considered by finding a geographic context (i.e. a country) where there are at least
two locations which represent extreme environmental situations. In this respect, Italy, the country
chosen for this analysis, provides a very useful case study for the following reasons. First, its
geographic configuration, a long latitudinal extension from the centre of Europe to the centre of the
Mediterranean Sea, makes it easy to identify two locations with the required characteristics. In fact,
if we applied our model in the north (for example, in Milan) and in the south (for example, in
Palermo) we would find two opposite situations in terms of regional environmental damage. The
case of Milan represents a very high environmental impact since it is located near a region (the
centre of Europe) which is densely populated and relatively far from the sea. On the contrary, the
case of Palermo represents a very low regional environmental impact since the city is located in a
region far from the centre of Europe and surrounded by the sea (since plant pollution is mainly
discharged directly into the sea, the potential environmental impact is very low5).
As mentioned earlier, this paper utilises the social cost-benefit analysis, a methodology widely
used when evaluating public investment choices. However, it has recently been adapted to study the
social impact of industry restructuring policies with emphasis on privatisation. In this new version,
a full social cost-benefit analysis would involve determining the net welfare difference and its
distribution. We should therefore be able not only to evaluate the overall impact on economic
efficiency but also to identify who gained, who lost and by how much. Therefore its main concerns
should be economic efficiency and equity.
We are not, however, concerned with equity issues since we are only interested in the overall
welfare change. Moreover, since we are dealing with “ideal” situations, consumers would gain all
the possible increases in social welfare due to DG deployment thus excluding possible allocative
inefficiency due to market power and considering only allocative distortions related to market
incompleteness due to externalities. Figure 2 schematically illustrates this procedure. Let us assume
two alternative supply models: model 1 (i.e. centralised supply) and model 2 (i.e. distributed
generation). According to Newbery (2001), we can assume that the public utility of the model 1 set
price p1 equal to unit cost sc1 (which in this case is equal to the average and marginal cost and
includes the normal return on capital) and sold the optimal quantity q1. Model 2 leads to a fall in
average and marginal cost to sc2 and demand increases to q2. Therefore the effect of replacing
model 1 with model 2 is an increase in social welfare equal to W∆  plus the area 2/qscL ∆⋅∆= . If
the elasticity of demand (as a positive number) is ε, then ( ) 2// 211 scscqscL ∆≈ ε . The ratio of L to
original cost (revenue) 11qsc  is ( ) 2// 2scsc∆ε . If the “cost saving” is also expressed as a fraction of
original cost (revenue), 11qsc , then ( ) 2222 // scscqscscsc ∆=∆ , which may be directly compared with
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 Moreover, Milan and Palermo also differ in terms of climate conditions (cold in the first case and mild in the second)
which influence CHP costs (the lower the heat needs for domestic heating and/or air conditioning, the higher the CHP
costs). We can therefore observe this effect without introducing an explicit variable in the estimating model.
9the proportional combined effect. For example, if the demand elasticity ε=0.1, and if 20/ 1 =∆ scsc
percent, then the combined effect will be 0.2 percent (of cost), two order of magnitude lower.
Therefore, since the elasticity of demand in the residential sector is extremely low, the area L can be
disregarded and the change in social welfare, as a proportion of original costs, is
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where sc , ic  and ec  are respectively social, internal and external costs per unit supplied.
Figure 2 – Cost-benefit of technological change
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Equation (1) alone cannot be the right criterion to determine whether DG is the new paradigm.
In fact, 0>∆w  is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to accept DG as the new paradigm
because this also depends on the difference in transaction costs between centralised and
decentralised supplies. We therefore have to ask ourselves which involves higher transaction costs.
In this respect, we have to recognise that decentralised models increase investment specificity,
uncertainty and transaction complexity. Each small plant is designed and sized to satisfy the needs
of a specific customer in terms of consumption level and profile. On the contrary, a large centralised
plant is designed and sized to supply energy to a large number of customers whose consumption
profiles are partially complementary. Therefore, DG involves investment specificity higher than
that of large power generation.
Moreover the owner of a small plant (on the customer side of the meter, which is the relevant
perspective of our analysis) has to manage a number of contractual relationships not only with gas
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suppliers but also with electricity suppliers (to contract power exchanges and ancillary services).
This increases uncertainty and complexity, which, combined with high specificity, determines
higher transaction costs. Therefore, given the need to consider this effect, the evaluation criterion
could be the following.
0<∆w  is a sufficient condition to reject DG as the new paradigm. In order to accept DG as the
new paradigm, the change in social welfare must be positive and higher than a specific threshold γ ,
related to the difference in transaction costs.
Unfortunately, we do not know what this threshold is and the economic literature does not
provide information in this respect. Nevertheless, for the moment it is sufficient to realize that the
possible increase in social welfare due to DG deployment must be high enough to cover the
increased transaction costs.
3. Energy saving
 Before assessing DG internal and external benefits, it is necessary to compare centralised and
decentralised systems in terms of energy efficiency, the first rough indicator of performance.
We consider six technological solutions: two based on centralised supply (A and B) and four on
decentralised supply (C1, C2, D1 and D2). Customer energy needs, including heat for domestic
heating and cold for air conditioning, depend on plant location (Milan or Palermo) while the
structural electricity needs are assumed to be identical (see table A1 of the Appendix).
 Centralised systems. Solution A includes a conventional condensing boiler providing heat
for space heating and sanitary uses (hot water). A conventional compressing refrigerator supplies
cold for air conditioning. Imported electricity is assumed to be generated by a combined cycle-gas
turbine plant (CCGT), with 51% electrical efficiency, which is the power generating marginal
technology. Energy losses due to electricity transport and distribution are assumed equal to 6%.
Solution B is based on a reversible heat pump which provides both heat for space heating (in
winter) and cold for air conditioning (in summer). Electricity is imported from the utility grid at the
same conditions of the previous system.
 Decentralised systems. Solution C1 produces combined heat and power by using a gas
engine technology. Cold for air conditioning is generated by means of an absorbing refrigerator
making use of the cogenerated heat. Solution C2 has the same configuration as C1 but combined
heat and power is produced by a gas turbine instead of a gas engine. C1 and C2 are “open”
solutions. Power plants are sized in order to satisfy the maximum heat demand so that they generate
power in excess of customer needs. This excess power is exported to the utility grid and accounted
for in terms of avoided fuel consumption of the large power generation (CCGT with 51% electrical
efficiency). Therefore, net primary energy is equal to DG fuel consumption minus the avoided fuel
consumption.
D1 and D2 systems are “isolated» since they do not involve importing/exporting electricity
from/to the utility grid. Power plants are sized in order to satisfy the maximum customer needs of
electricity. This implies that the amount of cogenerated heat is not sufficient to satisfy energy needs
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for domestic heating and air conditioning. We assume that the remaining heat (during the winter)
and cold (during the summer) are supplied by a reversible heat pump using cogenerated power.
Solution D1 uses a gas engine whereas solution D2 a gas turbine.
 Results. Table 1 shows that primary energy consumption of the decentralised solutions is
always lower than that of the centralised solutions and depends considerably on technologies and
locations (the technical data of the plants are reported in the Appendix). Energy saving is higher in
Milan where the climate conditions are more favourable to combined heat and power generation
(high ratio of heat and electricity needs) and the reciprocating engine always performs better than
the gas turbine. In the best case (“open” gas engine in Milan), energy saving can reach 40%, a value
high enough to encourage us to continue our analysis in order to verify DG performance in terms of
social benefits.
Table 1 – Primary energy consumption and energy saving
Centralised systems Decentralised systems
“Open” “Isolated”
A B C1 C2 D1 D2
Primary
Energy
Primary
Energy
B/A Primary
Energy
C1/A Primary
Energy
C2/A Primary
Energy
D1/A Primary
Energy
D2/A
MWh/y MWh/y MWh/y MWh/y MWh/y MWh/y
Milan
Residential 5.678 4.762 0.84 3.394 0.60 4.690 0.83 3.898 0.69 4.412 0.78
Hospital 58,765 51,924 0.88 40,131 0.68 49,907 0.85 42,598 0,72 48,230 0.82
Palermo
Residential 4.852 4.102 0.89 3.036 0.66 4.160 0.86 3.387 0.70 3.890 0.80
Hospital 52,045 47,572 0.91 37,922 0.73 46,561 0.90 39,955 0.77 45,563 0.88
4. Methodology
4.1. Internal cost/benefits
 In this section we attempt to measure DG internal benefits. Following the general approach
illustrated above, we have to assess the internal costs of centralised and decentralised supplies.
The crucial step in assessing the internal costs is to simulate the optimal prices of electricity and
gas inputs. Given the characteristics of the demand of such inputs, we have to simulate their long-
run marginal costs of supply at all segments of the industry cycle where there exists the so-called
12
peak-load pricing problem6. Unfortunately, since we cannot apply a similar procedure in the case of
natural gas and DG equipment productions, we are forced to keep their market prices. However, this
does not reduce the significance of our analysis since, as we shall later see, DG benefits are almost
insensitive to natural gas prices and only slightly sensitive to DG investment costs.
 The model. To simulate optimal prices of the electricity and gas supplies, we do not follow
the conventional peak-load pricing approach whose outcome is a vector of prices, each
corresponding to a specific time period of demand. We set out a method that directly provides the
unit price (per unit of energy consumed) of a typical annual supply by utilising a function
representing the customer demand profile over time. The staring point of such a method is to
evaluate the additional expenses the utility must sustain to serve a new customer with a given
consumption profile over time (see Appendix):
(2) ∑ ∫
=
−
∆⋅+∆⋅=∆
n
i
H
H
i
i
i
dHHPHvPfC
1
11
1
)()(
where )(HP∆  is the capacity demand profile over time of the new customer, with 1P∆  its peak
demand, )(Hvi  is the variable cost of the technology used for H hours in the year and 1f  the fixed
cost of the peak technology.
Equation (2) can be modified in order to obtain an approximate formulation very useful for our
purpose. Assume a new customer with annual consumption E and contractual capacity P. Let
PHEHPf )()),(( Φ=  be the measure of his responsibility in inducing the increase in peak capacity,
where H is the number of full consumption hours per year, and )(HΦ  is the peak probability
consumption that is the probability the new customer might consume during the peak hours, with
[ ]1,0)( ∈Φ H  and 0/)( >Φ dHHd [ ]TH ,0∈∀ . The equation (2) then becomes
(3) PHEEPC ⋅Φ⋅+⋅=∆ )(),( δµ
where 1f=δ  and ∫∫∑ ∆∆=
HHi
i dHHPdHHPHv )()()(µ  are respectively the fixed and the
average variable components and ∫∆=
H
dHHPE )( .
From equation (3) it is possible to express the optimal price per unit of consumption as
                                                          
6
 Setting optimal prices equal to long run marginal costs implicitly implies that we are supposing constant return to
scale or the possibility of transfers from the state to the operator. The first assumption is unreal because we face
increasing return to scale. Thus optimal prices should be calculated by maximising social welfare under the firm profit
constraint. The second would require taking into account the social impact of the public transfer. Nevertheless the
introduced approximation has only a marginal impact on the results of this analysis.
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(4) 
H
H
E
EPCp )()(),( Φ⋅+=∆= θδµ
Note that the fixed component is function of a parameterθ . This parameter is introduced in
order to take into account the “spatial” effects, such as the differences in costs due to customer
geographic density variability (in first approximation, it is justified to disregard the influence of the
territory on the variable components).
Equation (4) represents the classical two-part tariff and is very useful for our purposes. In fact, it
is sufficient to apply this simple formula at each stage of the electricity and gas industries (figures 3
and 4) in order to obtain the total optimal price of the input k:
(5) ∑  Φ⋅++=
m
k
kk
kkmkmgk H
H
cp
)()(θδµ
where gc  is the natural gas price, kmµ  and kmδ  are respectively the variable and fixed costs in the m
stage, )( kk HΦ the peak probability demand (with kkk PEH /= ) and [ ]kkk ββθ ,∈  the territorial
parameter.
Note that we assume 1)( =Φ H  in the cases of gas and electricity low voltage (LV) distributions.
There are two reasons for this assumption. On the one hand, in these industry segments, geographic
effects are more relevant than the “over time” effects. On the other hand, the topological
configuration of the low voltage electricity network and the low-pressure gas network is prevalently
radial (at least in Italy). Therefore, the problem of sharing fixed costs is less relevant than in the
case of electricity and gas transport or power generation.
By using equation 5 and taking into account DG investment costs IC and discounting over time,
we can finally find the expression of the internal costs, respectively for centralised, “isolated” and
“open” decentralised solutions:
(6a) [ ] ICdtetEtHptEtHpINTC
T
t
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eeeeggggCENTR +⋅⋅+⋅= ∫
=
⋅−
1
0
)();,()();,( θθ
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T
t
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DG +⋅⋅+⋅+⋅= ∫
=
⋅−
1
0
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where T1 is the plant lifetime, assumed the same for all plants, and r is the discount rate. neteE < 0 is
the net electricity exported to the grid, DGeP  is the power size of the “open” DG plant and eP  the
maximum capacity need of the customer. Notice that even in the case of “isolated” solutions there
must be an electricity distribution grid to provide ancillary services and permit the occasional
exchange of electricity (for example, when the consumption profile of the customer differs from
that assumed).  *eδ  and **eδ are the cost of grid interconnection respectively in the case of “isolated”
and “open” solutions7. Given equations (6a), (6b) and (6c), and according to the methodological
approach, DG benefits are
(7) 
CENTR
DG
DG INTC
INTC
INTB −= 1
                                                          
7
 The typical cost of grid interconnection ranges from 50–200 USD/kW depending on the size of the generator,
application, and utility requirements. The complexity of the interface increases with the level of interaction required
between the DG unit/owner and the electrical grid. See Arthur D. Little (1999).
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  Figure 3 – Value chain of the centralised model
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Figure 4 – Value chain of the decentralised model
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There is one last step in the application of equations (6) and (7): evaluating how the fixed price
components depend on «customer density». For this purpose we carry out two econometric models,
one for electricity distribution costs and the other for gas distribution costs.
It should be noted that «customer density» is an exogenous parameter which represents
customer concentration on the territory. Although the best indicator of territorial customer
concentration is the number of customers per unit of geographic area (i.e. number of customers per
km2), it is difficult to collect information about the extension of the area distribution of a utility.
Therefore, an alternative indicator is generally used, namely, the number of customers divided by
the length of distribution lines (or the length of gas distribution pipelines), which is a good proxy of
the territorial density of the customers.
Electricity distribution costs. The economic literature is quite controversial regarding the
determinants of electricity distribution costs. On the one hand, several estimation models (Roberts,
1986; Nelson and Primeaux, 1988, Salvanes and Tjoota, 1994) emphasise the importance of
economies of scale but disregard the economies of density. These models, based on the elaboration
of samples of different distribution utilities, do not seem to be well formulated so that in some cases
the differences in distribution costs due to «customer density» dispersion are attributed to efficiency
gaps or to input price disparities (Gullì, 2000). On the other hand, more recent analysis partially
eliminates this ambiguity by proposing estimates which clearly demonstrate the importance of
economies of density in determining distribution costs (Filippini, 1998; Gullì, 2000; Folloni 2001).
The model we present below belongs to this last category. It is particularly significant since it is
based on data-series of the distribution areas of a single utility (Enel, which is the dominant
distribution utility in Italy). The econometric analysis of these data allows us to clearly separate the
effects of economies of scale and density:
(8) 



=
+++=
84.0
)9.4(
111.0ln
)5.7(
240.0ln
)4.26(
826.0
)4.4(
474.1ln
2
r
DUMCL
t
TC eeeeD θ
eDTC  is the total cost of electricity distribution, eCL  is the total number of customers supplied at
medium and low voltage and eθ  is the inverse of the territorial «customer density» (the number of
customers divided by the length of distribution lines). eDUM  is a dummy which discriminates
between the distribution areas of Centre-North of Italy ( eDUM = 0) and those of the South of Italy
( eDUM = 1).
Since model (8) is based on data referring to19968, it cannot be directly used for our purposes.
Nevertheless, since we do not need absolute values but only an indicator of their geographic
dispersion (that in an initial approximation can be assumed constant over time), model (8) can be
used to calculate a normalised cost function representing distribution cost normalised to its average
value. However, before normalising, equation (8) must be reformulated in order to “neutralise” the
                                                          
8
 Values are in 1996 ITL. Since we are concerned with normalised costs, it is not necessary to convert these values to
USD.
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effects that are not due to «customer density» dispersion, first of all those deriving from economies
or diseconomies of scale. Since we are, in fact, dealing with ideal situations we should imagine that
all firms, or distribution areas, are optimally sized. Since effects of scale are captured by the
coefficient a1, in order to obtain the “neutral” function we must convert model (8) to exponential
form and divide by the term 826.0eCL . Therefore, equation (8) becomes
(9)   EFCLNTC eeeeD ⋅⋅= 240.0367.4),( θθ
where eDUMeEF 111.0= , with 1=EF  when 0=eDUM and 1=EF when 1=eDUM .117.
Figure 5 – Density distribution of electricity normalised distribution costs
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By dividing (9) by the average value of the “neutral” cost we can obtain the normalised cost
which is the parameter representative of the territorial dispersion of electricity distribution costs:
(10) 
eD
eeD
eeD NTC
NTC )()( θθρ =
where eDNTC  is the average value of the normalised costs. Figure 5 illustrates )( eeD θρ density
distribution for the data set of the electricity distribution areas in Italy.
Finally, by multiplying the fixed components of the optimal distribution prices by )( eeD θρ , we
can  simulate the impact of the «customer density» variability on the electricity distribution costs:
(11) )( eeDeDeD θρδδ ⋅=
Natural gas distribution costs. The economic literature on natural gas distribution costs is less
extensive than the one on electricity distribution costs. The study carried out by AEEG (2000) is the
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only one available on Italy.  Since only the final results of this study have been published, we do not
know the characteristics of the sample used and therefore cannot propose our own elaboration. We
therefore have to use the AEEG model without checking its reliability. This study separately
analyses operating and capital costs. As regards operating costs, the proposed estimation model is
the following:
(12)



=
++=
98.0
ln
)6.2(
209.0ln
)7.47(
051.1
)5.5(
196.112ln
2
r
CL
t
OPC gggD θ
where gDOPC  are the operating costs, gCL  is the number of customers (medium and low pressure)
and gθ  is the inverse of «customer density» (number of customers divided by the length of gas
distribution pipelines).
As regards capital costs, a direct estimation of the unit cost (per customer) is proposed:
(13)



=
+⋅+
−
−+=
85.0
ln
)3.2(
035.0ln
)8.3(
111.0ln
)8.2(
011.0ln649.0
)4.31(
089.12ln
2
)4.14(
r
GFPOPZ
t
CCPC ggD θ
where gDCCPC  are capital costs per customer, Z  is a parameter representing territorial shape (flat,
hill or mountain), POP  is the population (number of habitants), )000,500( −= POPGF  if
000,500>POP e 1=GF  if 000,500≤POP (this dummy is introduced to distinguish the urban centres
(densely populated) and the rural territories (sparsely populated).
Since the data refer to 1998, they can not be directly used in our study. However, like the
previous case, it is sufficient for our purposes to calculate a normalised function. Therefore, by
exactly following the proceeding adopted in the case of electricity, we get
(14)   035.0011.06485.0209.0 23.17791103,198002 GFZNCCPCNOPCNTC flatgggDgDgD ⋅⋅+⋅=+= −θθ
From (14) it is now possible to derive the parameter representative of cost dispersion in function
of the «customer density»:
(15)
gD
ggD
ggD NTC
NTC )()( θθρ =
Equation (15) allows us to simulate geographic marginal costs on using the analogous
proceeding of the electricity case:
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(16) )( ggDgDgD θρδδ ⋅=
The meanings of all the parameters are analogous to those already shown in the electricity case.
Figure 6 illustrates the density distribution of )( ggD θρ values.
Figure 6 – Density distribution of gas normalised distribution costs
            
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.75 0.79 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.03 1.07 1.11 1.15
Normalized costs
Pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
de
ns
ity
4.2. External cost/benefits
 Energy production and consumption cause damage to a wide range of receptors, including
human health, natural ecosystem, materials, monuments, etc.. Such damage is referred to as external
costs since they are not reflected in the market price of energy. They are due to various agents:
atmospheric and non-atmospheric pollutants, accidents and occupational diseases, noise, amenities
etc.. Our analysis only considers the effects of the main atmospheric pollutants (which represent the
relevant part of the total damage).
Unlike internal costs, external costs can be permanent since they can appear many years after
the plant lifetime and/or persist over time. For some categories of impacts this behaviour is
negligible (i.e. local and regional effects) while for others (i.e. global warming) it is rather
considerable so that the time damage horizon T2 can be much higher than the plant lifetime T1.
These introductory remarks are meant to explain why we will distinguish local-regional effects
(essential due to SOx, NOx and particulate emissions) and global impact (due to GHG emissions).
The total external cost EC can be expressed as
(17) ∑=
z
zz QEXTC α
where z is a generic pollutant,
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 is the discounted amount of z pollutant emitted during the plant operating life, with )(tQz  the
amount emitted of  z pollutant in t , and
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is the unit external cost (per unit of pollutant emitted). ),( ϑtDz   is the monetary value of the damage
in time ϑ  due to the emissions of the z pollutant in time t , with 0),( =ϑtDz ϑ>∀t .
By using equation (17) we can finally find the expression of the external costs, respectively for
centralized, “isolated” and “open” decentralized solutions:
(20a) ∑=
z
centr
z
centr
zcentr QEXTC α
(20b) ∑=
z
DG
z
DG
z
isolated
DG QEXTC α
(20c) ∑∑ −=
z
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z
centr
z
z
DG
z
DG
z
open
DG QQEXTC αα
where  centravzQ  is the avoided pollutant emissions of the large power generation (CCGT with 51%
electrical efficiency9).
Given equations (20) and according to the methodological approach, DG benefits are
(21) 
centr
DG
DG EXTC
EXTC
EXTB −=1
In order to calculate the zα  coefficients, we use the “ExternE” methodology briefly described
below10.
 External cost coefficient evaluation.11. The “ExternE” methodology12 follows the bottom-
up approach and is based on a step-by-step procedure. In fact, it requires dealing with cascade
                                                          
9
 Minus the energy losses due to electricity transport and distribution (assumed equal to 6%).
10
 For a detailed description, see European Commission (1998a).
11
 For a critical analysis of the methods of economic evaluation of the environmental externalities, see Stirling (1997).
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phases: 1) the determination of the emissions for each stage of the fuel cycle (from the production
of primary input to the output production); 2) a simulation of the dispersion of the pollutants both
on a local and regional scale; 3) the identification of all the receptors; 4) the calculation of the
impact (by means of the application of the “dose-response” functions); 5) where possible, the
economic evaluation of such an impact.
The pollutants taken into consideration are solid, liquid and gaseous residues. The main impact is
due to the emissions of CO2, SOx, NOx and particulate (PM10).
The damage taken into consideration includes the effects on public health, agriculture, forests
(acid rain),  the ecosystem in general, materials (deterioration of buildings and monuments) and the
damage related to  global warming as a result of GHG emissions.
Dose-response functions provide the marginal damage caused by increment of concentration due
to plant emissions. They can be linear, non-linear and with a threshold.
“Willingness to pay or to accept” is the standard measure of the value in environmental
economics adopted throughout the ExternE project.
The analysis conducted in the ExternE Project shows that the uncertainties of external cost
assessment are significant and difficult to quantify, especially as regards global warming
estimations. Part of this uncertainty depends on social-political choices, which mainly reflect on the
discount rate choice, while the remaining part is statistical. Statistical uncertainty regards both the
physical/chemical phenomena and economic estimations. The former is essentially due to the
difficulty of simulating the temperature increase and its profile over time due to GHG emissions.
The latter mainly refers to the process impacting on monetary value of global warming, such as the
forecast of economic development in the next one hundred years.
In order to isolate the problem of uncertainty, which mainly refers to global warming
estimations, our analysis deals separately with local-regional effects (LR), mostly due to SOx, NOx
and PM10 emissions, and the global effects (GW), due to GHG emissions. This distinction is also
important because it allows us to identify the role of discounting in assessing external costs.
Local and regional effects (LR). Since local and regional effects are not permanent, by assuming
LR
zD  constant over time, equation (19) becomes
(22) 
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Therefore SOx, NOx and PM10 coefficients do not depend on discount rate, thus allowing us to
disregard the problem of social-political uncertainty. Furthermore, as statistical uncertainty about
local and regional impacts is much lower than that related to global warming estimations, we do not
                                                                                                                                                                                                
12
 This brief note on methodology content reflects the general description made by Valette (1995). See also the
European Commission (1998a, 1998b).
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take into account its effect, directly using the best guess of the related statistical distributions13.
From (22) and by applying the ExternE model, we obtain the results illustrated in table 2.
 
 Table 2 – External costs (ExternE model) per unit of pollutant (local and regional effects)
 Sectors  Local and regional effects
 
  SOx  PM10  NOx
  USD/kg  USD/kg  USD/kg
 Gas fired boiler and DG technologies   
   Milan  20.9  42.9  21.0
   Palermo  13.4  26.7  10.8
 Large power plant (Combined cycle)   
   Italy  9.5  11.4  9.3
The following conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, local and regional effects largely
depend on plant localisation. All other conditions being equal, external costs are much lower in
Palermo than in Milan. This is due to the macro-localisation effect, thus confirming our preliminary
intuition about the choice of geographic applications. Second, there are considerable differences
between centralised and decentralised technologies, the first showing lower external cost
coefficients. These differences are due to micro-localisation effects. In fact, unlike large power
plants (high stack and extra-urban location) distributed technologies have low stacks and are
generally located in densely populated urban areas. Because of low stack (emissions at extremely
low quotas) pollutant atmospheric dilution is lower so that the increases in pollutant concentration
close to the plant are greater than those of a large power plant. Due to location, these high increases
in pollutant concentration occur in highly populated areas and seriously damage human health. With
the macro-localisation being equal, these combined effects cause an environmental impact (per unit
of pollutant emitted) much greater than that of a large power plant.
Global effects. It is apparently easier to assess the external cost coefficients of global warming. The
marginal damage (per unit of pollutant emitted) does not in fact depend on technology and plant
localisation. Therefore, there is no need to implement specific simulations since it is sufficient to
utilise the estimations already proposed by ExternE. Nevertheless, given the high uncertainty
mentioned earlier, ExternE does not propose a single value but statistical distributions obtained by
means of a series of simulations, each for a particular value of discount rate, and well fitted by
                                                          
13
 The best guess (i.e. the marginal cost with all parameters set at their central estimate) is a conservative estimate of the
marginal cost of pollutant emissions.
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lognormal functions14. ExternE suggests15 using a discount rate ranging from 1% to 3% whose
density distributions, reported in figure 7, will be directly used in our estimating model in order to
take into account the effects of both statistical and political uncertainty16.
Figure 7 – Uncertainty regarding the marginal costs of carbon dioxide
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5. Fully decentralised models: results
5.1. Internal cost/benefits
 Figure 8 illustrates the results obtained from applying equations (6a), (6b) and (7) and using
the data reported in the Appendix17. These results are presented in terms of density distribution in
order to show the impact of «customer density» dispersions. On the horizontal axis of the graphs the
ratio of costs (DG costs divided by centralised system costs) is reported (the benefit is one minus
the value of this indicator). The following conclusions can be drawn from this figure.
                                                          
14
 These simulations are based on the use of the Montecarlo method and the FUND model. FUND is a model
calculating GHG  marginal damage. Its strengths are in dynamic and integrated analysis. See European Commission
(1998a, 1998b).
15
 Regarding the problem of discounting in environmental cost-benefit analysis, see European Commission (1998a;
1998b).
16
 It is necessary to bear in mind that there are other GHG other than the carbon dioxide, such as CH4 and N2O. The
specific contribution of these gases to global warming is higher than that of CO2 but the amount emitted is much lower
(of one order of magnitude). In order to take into account even these gases, emitted by fuel cycles, the equivalent CO2
greenhouse potential is normally used: 3.8 in the case of CH4 and 94 in the case of N2O. For a criticism of this
procedure see Schmalensee (1993).
17
 For the moment, we assume a discount rate equal to 1%, which is consistent with the range of values adopted for
discounting the environmental monetary damage (see later).
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First, value dispersions are very low, much lower than those of normalised costs themselves.
This is an important result because it implies rejecting the commonly held belief that the structure
of the territory could play a crucial role in determining DG competitiveness. In fact, this could be
true, for example, in the case of renewable energy sources but not in the case of gas fired
technologies18.
   Second, it clearly emerges that the framework of DG competitiveness is not very encouraging
from the internal benefits point of view. In Milan, both gas engines and gas turbines provide
benefits when compared to the conventional centralised solution but these benefits are almost
negligible (not exceeding 8%). The picture is totally different when we compare DG technologies to
the heat pump, the advanced centralised solution. DG never provides benefits, in the case of both
gas engines and gas turbines. In Palermo, the results are even less encouraging. In all cases, DG
never provides benefits.
In conclusion, the internal cost-benefit analysis does not confirm the optimistic framework
emerging from energy efficiency comparison. Even though distributed generation assures
significant levels of energy saving, its costs are still higher than those of centralised supply.
However this result is not very surprising. Conventional DG is generally subsidised and generally
considered competitive only in specific market niches although several authors emphasise its
potential when used to provide combined heat and power. Therefore, the question shifts to the
degree of DG environmental benefits which commonly inform the environmental policies
supporting DG deployment.
                                                          
18
 This result can be easily explained. As the above-mentioned econometric models have pointed out, electricity and gas
distribution costs depend on territorial parameters in a similar way. Therefore the ratio of centralised and decentralised
costs cannot change very much with “customer density”. As a matter of fact, a comparison between centralized
production and distributed generation can also be regarded as a trade-off between scale economies and network effects.
In theory, the internal benefits of distributed generation are greater where “customer density” is lower and vice versa.
Therefore low customer density would be a first candidate for “isolated” DG. However, there are two reasons why this
is only partly true. First, as previously pointed out, even in the “isolated” solutions, the development of DG needs a low
voltage distribution network (distributed generation does not avoid the distribution costs, even though these are lower
compared to the case of centralised supply). Second, the development of DG involves expanding gas consumption and
therefore additional gas distribution costs which are higher where “consumer density” is lower. These additional costs
partly counterbalance the partial savings on electricity distribution costs. In extremes, even in the long term (when
everyone is self-supplying) the distribution network effects (electricity plus natural gas) are not huge. For these reasons
in our model (which does not, however, capture short and medium term transitory effects) the internal benefits of DG
are low sensitive to “customer density”.
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Figure 8 – Internal cost/benefits of distributed generation (“isolated” residential applications)
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5.2. External cost/benefits
 Before showing DG external cost-benefit in terms of density distribution, it is useful to give
an idea of the weight of the single pollutants in determining the total external costs. For this purpose
we use the best guess of the marginal costs of carbon dioxide (both for 1% and 3% discount rate).
The results are reported in table 319 which clearly shows that the total external costs sensible depend
on the variability of the marginal cost of carbon dioxide. This confirms the need of considering the
probability distribution instead of a single value.
Table 3 – Emission rate and external costs per kWh of fuel
 Sectors  Global effects (1)
 
 Local and regional effects (1)
  Emissions  Emissions
  CO2eq
 
 Global
 External costs
 (best guess)
 
 
 SOx
 
 PM10
 
 NOx
 
 Local and
regional
external costs
 
 
 Total external costs
 (best guess)
   
 (r = 1%)
 
 (r = 3%)
 
     
 (r = 1%)
 
 (r = 3%)
 
  (g/kWh)  (USD/t CO2)  (g/MWh)  (g/MWh)  (g/MWh)  (mUSD/kWh)  (mUSD/kWh)
 
Gas fired boiler       
   Milan  202.7
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.7
 
 0.0
 
 32.9
 
 1.61
 (0.89)
 10.93  4.85
  Palermo  202.7
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.7
 
 0.0
 
 32.9
 
 1.26
 (0.89)
 10.58  4.50
 DG technologies        
 Gas fired engine        
 Milan  195.1
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.0
 
 4.9
 
 358.8
 
 8.66
 (0.89)
 17.63  11.78
 Palermo  195.1
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.0
 
 4.9
 
 358.8
 
 4.90
 (0.89)
 13.87  8.02
 Gas turbine        
 Milan  197.3
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.0
 
 9.8
 
 140.7
 
 4.28
 (0.89)
 13.36  7.44
 Palermo  197.3
 (14.0)
 46  16  1.0
 
 9.8
 
 140.7
 
 2.68
 (0.89)
 11.76  5.84
 Large power plant (Combined Cycle)       
   Italy  193.7
 (14.0)
 46  16  0.9
 
 9.2
 
 13.9
 
 1.13
 (0.89)
 10.04
 
 4.23
        
(1) Within brackets external costs of exploration, production and transportation fuel cycle stages.
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 Note that the coefficients include not only the external cost of power plant operation but also the monetary damage
due to the upstream stages of the fuel cycles (exploration, production, transportation, etc.).
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Figure 9 – DG external cost/benefits (“isolated” residential applications)
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Given the estimates of the local and regional monetary damage reported in table 2 and the
probability distribution of global monetary damage reported in figure 7, we can now calculate the
external DG benefits in terms of density distributions (figure 9). We follow the same procedure
adopted for the internal cost analysis, reporting the ratio of costs (DG costs divided by centralised
costs) on the horizontal axis (the benefit is one minus the value of this indicator).
The following conclusions can be drawn from Figure 9. First, the estimate dispersions are
considerably lower than those of global warming cost estimations themselves, so that DG social
cost-benefit can be clearly identified. Figure 9 bears this out quite clearly. In the case of gas engines
in Milan, and compared to the conventional centralised system, there is a probability of around 30%
that DG could provide benefits but this probability disappears using 3% discount rate. The picture is
quite different when we compare DG to the heat pump (the advanced centralised system).
Decentralisation never provides benefits at either the 1% or 3% discount rate. A similar result
emerges from the gas turbine application. In Palermo, the situation is slightly better but again DG
never provides environmental benefits compared to the heat pump.
These results are even more evident if we analyse the cost-benefit cumulative curves together
(figure 10). When we assume 1% discount rate, DG provides some benefits compared to the
conventional centralised system but no benefits compared to the totally electric solution. By
assuming 3% discount rate, DG costs are always higher than centralised costs, both conventional
and advanced.
Figure 10 – DG external cost/benefits: cumulative distribution curves
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In conclusion, the analysis of the external costs seems to confirm the rather discouraging
framework which already emerged from the assessment of the internal costs since DG appears to be
low competitive even from the environmental point of view. However, this time, the result is quite
surprising, considering that the supposed environmental benefits generally inform the policies
designed to support distributed generation. This analysis would thus support the idea that such
environmental policies are ambiguous since, by focusing on global warming, they disregard the
possible trade-off between local-regional and global impacts.
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5.3. Total cost/benefits
 We have now reached the concluding point. By adding together internal and external costs,
we can obtain the total costs of centralised and decentralised models and consequently the DG
social benefits. For the sake of simplicity, we do not present the results in terms of the density
distribution illustrated above and only report their best guess (table 4).
Total costs fully confirm the unfavourable outcome for distributed generation. Looking at the
best guess values, DG total costs are lower than those of large power supply only in the case of gas
turbine in Milan with 1% discount rate, and compared to the conventional centralised system.
However, even in these cases, cost saving does not exceed 3%.
Table 4 – Social costs and benefits (best guess): “isolated” residential applications
Centralised systems Decentralised systems
A B D1 D1/A D1/B D2 D2/A D2/B
(kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD)
MILANO
Internal
(r = 1%) 217.5 198.1 206.4 0.95 1.04 209.6 0.96 1.06
(r = 3%) 222.1 204.0 214.6 0.97 1.05 217.9 0.98 1.07
External
(r = 1%) 59.5 49.8 68.7 1.15 1.38 58.9 0.99 1.18
(r = 3%) 25.8 22.0 46.0 1.78 2.09 32.9 1.28 1.50
Total
(r = 1%) 277.0 247.9 275.1 0.99 1.11 268.5 0.97 1.08
(r = 3%) 247.9 226.0 260.6 1.05 1.15 250.8 1.01 1.11
PALERMO
Internal
(r = 1%) 195.9 183.2 209.7 1.07 1.14 214.3 1.09 1.17
(r = 3%) 200.5 189.1 218.8 1.09 1.16 223.5 1.11 1.18
External
(r = 1%) 46.5 41.7 46.8 1.01 1.12 45.7 0.98 1.10
(r = 3%) 19.9 17.8 27.2 1.37 1.53 22.8 1.15 1.28
Total
(r = 1%) 242.4 224.9 256.5 1.06 1.14 260.0 1.07 1.16
(r = 3%) 220.4 206.9 246.0 1.12 1.19 246.3 1.12 1.19
Energy saving due to CHP and reduced transmission costs are therefore not sufficient to ensure
DG social competitiveness. Large power generation is still largely preferable from this point of
view. To be more specific, saving on fuel and electricity transport costs are compensated by higher
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investment costs while the environmental benefits due to reduced GHG emissions are largely offset
(on average) by the higher local-regional impacts.
Nevertheless, our analysis does not end here. We still have to verify the robustness of the final
results by measuring their sensitivity to the variability of those parameters previously considered
fixed. This sensitivity analysis will also help us find the overall range of social DG competitiveness.
5.4. Sensitivity analysis
 Sensitivity analysis is useful not only to verify the robustness of the previous results but also
for two other important reasons. On the one hand, as mentioned above, it helps us understand how
the variability of some crucial parameters affects DG benefits and as such allows us to identify the
overall range of DG social competitiveness. On the other hand, it could useful in pointing out how
DG could improve in the near future.
The main factors affecting DG benefits can be grouped into four categories: structural climate
conditions; highly volatile “over time” parameters; technological-related factors; network-related
parameters.
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we restrict our investigation to the gas
turbine in Milan (D2), which is the best DG solution from social benefits point of view.
 Structural conditions (climate). The base case concerns two locations, Milan and Palermo,
which represent two extreme situations in terms of environmental impact. Unfortunately, these two
locations are complementary in terms of climate conditions. In Milan, where the environmental
impact is higher, the climate is colder so that CHP is more profitable and DG internal costs are
lower. In the case of Palermo, the situation is just the opposite. Since the situation is so
complementary, it implies a sort of partial compensation between external and internal costs so that
the two locations do not perfectly represent the two extreme situations of climate and geographic
locations considered together. Therefore, in order to eliminate this effect, we can swap the climate
situations of the two locations by simulating in Milan the climate conditions of Palermo (worst
case) and in Palermo the climate conditions of Milan (best case). Figure 11 shows the result of this
swap: switching from the base to the worst case implies a considerable decrease in DG benefits
whereas switching from the base to the best case implies only marginal improvements so that the
ratio of costs is still higher than one.
 Volatility. Although all the parameters affecting DG benefits may change over time, some
may change more than others. Of these, natural gas price is certainly the most important. In order to
take into account the impact of its volatility we refer to historical data and in particular to the range
of the annual average price variability over the last twenty years. By using this range we obtain the
sensitivity shown in figure 11. As we can see, DG benefits are so low sensitive to natural gas price
variability that it cannot be considered a crucial factor of DG social competitiveness.
 Technological progress. Technological progress affects DG social cost-benefit mainly
through the electrical efficiency and the investment costs of CHP small plants. In order to verify the
impact of these factors, we can refer to plausible ranges of variability. Regarding investment costs,
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we agree with those who do not expect reductions higher that 30% in the near future. Regarding net
plant efficiency, engineers predict only marginal improvements in the next few years, so that +/-
10% seems a plausible range. In the two cases of plant efficiency and investments costs, we also
report the lower and upper boundaries in order to take into account current possible overestimation
of DG performance. As figure 11 shows, DG benefits are low sensitivity to investment costs and
high sensitivity to plant efficiency. The latter therefore appears to be the crucial parameter of DG
social competitiveness even though the best case (+10%) again falls above the competitiveness
threshold (before considering transaction costs).
Figure 11 – Sensitivity analysis
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 Transport network congestion. Electricity and gas transport costs utilised in the base case
are average values. Therefore they do not take into account the possible effect of grid congestion.
Indeed, we are not sure that such effects should be included in this analysis. In fact, in an “ideal”
framework congestion would not occur because generating and transport capacity would be
optimally expanded without significant divergences over time and/or over “space” (see paragraph 2
above). However, in order to give an idea even about the influence of transport costs, we attempt to
simulate their impact. This simulation is quite simple for natural gas. Detailed data on gas
transportation are in fact available for Italy. Gas transport price ranges from a minimum of 1.85 to a
maximum of 5.69 USD/m3 per day (–42 ÷ 79% compared to the average value used in the base
case) depending on customer and gas field (or importing point) locations. Unfortunately, since such
information is not available for electricity in Italy, we refer to the geographic value dispersion of the
electricity system in England20: from 14.0 to 16.7 USD/kW (-84 ÷ 90% of the base case value).
Figure 11 shows that DG benefits are very low sensitive to both natural gas and electricity transport
costs.
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 Overall range of DG social competitiveness. Sensitivity analysis clearly demonstrates that
the results emerging from the base case are extremely robust. No parameter (considered separately)
can invert the previous negative evaluation of DG competitiveness. Nevertheless, this is not enough
since we still have to verify what can be obtained by combining parameter variability. In particular,
we are interested in the case in which all variables are favourable (i.e. Milan climate in Palermo,
high natural gas price, low DG investment costs, high DG plant efficiency, etc.) or unfavourable
(i.e. low natural gas price, high DG investment costs and so on) to DG deployment. These two
extreme cases in fact identify by far the best and worst case of DG social competitiveness. Figure
12 shows the outcome of this effort. The results are presented in terms of cumulative distributions
in order to keep the uncertainty regarding the external cost estimations. The first observation
concerns curve shapes that are almost vertical thus reconfirming that uncertainty has a very low
impact on DG benefits. This allows us to clearly identify the social value of distributed generation
and to be certain of the effectiveness of the social cost-benefit analysis implemented here. In fact,
figure 12 provides an indisputable picture since the range of positive values of DG benefits (ratio of
costs lower than one) are very restricted. As we can see, an extremely low increase in transaction
costs (around 5%) would be sufficient to totally cancel the DG competitiveness area. This negative
outcome occurs even if we measure DG social value in terms of difference between costs (DG
social costs minus centralised system costs). This range of competitiveness is again very limited and
is very low sensitive to the value of marginal cost of carbon dioxide emissions (the result is almost
the same, ranging from 1 USD to 1000 USD per tonne of carbon emitted). This again underlines the
scant importance of uncertainty in determining DG social value.
Figure 12 – Overall range of DG social competitiveness
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6. Hybrid models: results
 The result of the analysis described in the preceding paragraph has two policy implications.
On the one hand, it means that eliminating possible technical and economic barriers would not be
sufficient to promote a highly decentralized model of energy supply (providing this is technically
feasible). On the other, it suggests avoiding policy measures which tend to push distributed
generation to the limit, with a view to gradually replacing centralized production.
Nevertheless, the question of the “paradigm change” is not the only important question. In fact,
in addition to verifying whether it is justified to push to the limit, it is important to understand if and
to what extent it would be socially justified to develop DG (where to “stop”).
This requires analysing the social benefits of supply models in which distributed generation and
centralized production co-exist (hybrid models).
This co-existence can occur in two ways: by means of the “open” solutions described in
paragraph 3 or the “isolated” solutions applied, however, to customers larger than the residential
one, in terms of energy consumption.
Table 5 – Social costs and benefits (best guess; per annum; r = 1%)
Fully
Centralised
Hybrid Fully decentralised
“Isolated” “Open” “Isolated”
B D1 D1/B D2 D2/B C1 C1/B C2 C2/B D1 D1/B D2 D2/B
(kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD) (kUSD)
MILAN
Residential
Internal 198.1 - - - - 201.5 1.02 213.3 1.08 206.4 1.04 209.6 1.06
External 49.8 - - - - 106.3 2.13 78.6 1.58 68.7 1.38 58.9 1.18
Total 247.9 - - - - 307.8 1.24 291.9 1.18 275.1 1.11 268.5 1.08
Hospital
Internal 1817.1  1471.3 0.81 1576.1 0.87 1571.6 0.86 1690.6 0.93 - - - -
External 526.6 752.6 1.43 646.0 1.23 957.1 1.82 736.8 1.40 - - - -
Total 2343.7  2223.9 0.95 2222.1 0.95 2528.7 1.08 2426.8 1.04 - - - -
PALERMO
Residential
Internal 183.2 - - - - 224.8 1.23 306.2 1.67 209.7 1.14 214.3 1.17
External 41.7 - - - - 60.3 1.45 55.3 1.33 46.8 1.12 45.7 1.10
Total 224.9 - - - - 285.1 1.27 361.5 1.61 256.5 1.14 260.0 1.16
Hospital
Internal 1667.8 1503.3 0.90 1606.4 0.96 1729.0 1.04 2087.7 1.25 - - - -
External 481.4 534.7 1.11 537.0 1.12 613.2 1.27 573.0 1.19 - - - -
Total 2149.2 2038.0 0.95 2143.4 1.00 2342.2 1.09 2660.7 1.24 - - - -
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Therefore, by following the methodology described in paragraph 4 and applying equations (6)
and (20), it is possible to simulate the social costs and benefits of the hybrid solutions (technical and
economic data are reported in the Appendix). Table 5 shows the following:
1. The hybrid models based on the “open” solutions imply social costs which are considerably
higher than those of the “isolated” solutions. This is due to internal costs but mainly external ones.
2. The hybrid models based on large-size “isolated” solutions (i. e. the hospital) ensure an
improvement compared to the fully decentralized ones. However, this improvement, which is due to
lower internal costs, is rather limited. At best, saving on total costs (internal plus external) does not
exceed 5%.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the hybrid solutions involve problems of equity. Since
distributed generation is a typical case of bypass or regulated competition it might introduce
externalities from one category (product) to other categories of customers (products) and is
therefore a potential source of inequity.
The economic literature on this issue confirms this. Curien et. al. (1998) analyse optimal pricing
regulation under bypass competition and shows that bypass introduces a negative externality from
consumers using bypass to consumers using the local network or, when public transfer are allowed,
to taxpayers. However the authors assume there is perfect competition in the bypass market while in
our case the bypass a regulated firm provides the bypass (network to network competition).
This is why we have also looked at some contributions on regulated competition. In particular
Brauetigam (1984) demonstrates that, under specific conditions when firms are separately
regulated, the optimal social mark up on marginal costs is higher in competitive market segments. A
better result is obtained when the two firms are regulated as if they were one.
Apart from their specific applications, these contributions highlight an interesting issue. If the
technology is a simple bypass, that is, if it is only competitive for a few categories of customers (for
example, gross consumers), it reduces the welfare of the other categories. Therefore, its overall
(social) impact is uncertain.
In conclusion, the analysis of the hybrid models points out that we are not faced with a “convex”
world. The intermediate models have social costs which are much higher than the two extreme
(polar) situations if they are the “open” kind or, in any case, lower than the centralized solutions
(considering the transaction costs) if they are the “isolated” kind.
7. Why so much interest in distributed generation? The role of the market distortions
 What emerges from the cost-benefit analysis described does not question the present social
value of distributed generation. We are not moving towards a new paradigm of the network energy
industry. Large power supply is still preferable to decentralised one both from purely an economic
(private) and environmental point of view. Rather the analysis emphasises the benefits of further
centralisation through the deployment of the totally electric solution (the heat pump) that emerges
as the best option.
Given these results, the following obvious question arises: why are regulators, policymakers and
operators so optimistic about DG deployment?
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Before answering the question it might be useful to reflect upon the simultaneity of
technological change and market reforms. Most authors think that emerging DG economic viability
is mainly due to the effect of the energy market reforms. Unbundling of services (e.g. generation,
transmission, distribution, and auxiliary services) and, where possible, competition involve price
unbundling (over time and space) thus providing a favourable environment for DG investments.
Although this is certainly true in theory, in our opinion, it is not sufficient to legitimise the
emphasis on DG development, for two reasons.
First, price unbundling over time (peak/off-peak) can promote DG deployment only when the
marginal cost of the small plants is lower than the peak prices of large power supply (including
electricity transport). This could, for example, be possible when the centralised peak technology is a
large gas turbine (with 32-38% plant efficiency) and the small technology is a reciprocating engine
(with 40-42% plant efficiency) and taking the saving in electricity transport costs into account.
However, under normal conditions (i.e. absence of capacity scarcity) the margin of competitiveness
would be very limited even in this favourable case and probably not sufficient to recover the DG
fixed costs.
The situation is quite different when there is market power in the power market or stringent
constraints on generation and transport capacity.
Liberalising power generation and creating spot markets are not sufficient conditions to ensure
effective   competition. Emerging market power might lead to set prices above the marginal costs
and this circumstance strongly raises DG profitability. Figure 13 illustrates the importance of this
effect. On the horizontal axis we report the Lerner index, which is an indicator of market power,
and on the vertical axis the ratio of internal costs (DG costs divided by centralised system costs). As
we can see, DG benefits are very high sensitive to market power. If we assume the values of the
Lerner index estimated by Borenstein et al. (1999) for the California and PJM markets, DG internal
benefits can reach values ranging from 40% to 50%.
Figure 13 – Impact of price inefficiencies
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Moreover, market power is not the only potential source of high price volatility. It can also
result from emerging capacity scarcity both in generation and transmission segments. In the
previous pages we have already pointed out that in this connection market organisations are not
indifferent. Since spot markets look at short time horizons, they might be unable to provide
adequate price signals to develop capacity in the long run. In other words, spot markets might create
structural conditions of over and under capacity thus increasing price volatility. Furthermore,
industry vertical unbundling (separation between generation and transmission stages) eliminates
explicit investment co-ordination while implicit co-ordination through prices might not be sufficient
to ensure a balanced development of generation and transport capacities (both over time and space).
It is therefore undoubtedly true that market reforms can create an environment favourable to DG
deployment through industry and price unbundling. However, it is also true that this deployment
could be the result of inefficient outcomes, involving too much price volatility in the short and long
run, rather than the natural outcome of DG social competitiveness.
Second, our analysis also shows that the positive impact due to unbundling of distribution prices
over space is overestimated. In fact it would positively affect DG benefits only if it involved one
service (i.e. electricity), the other (natural gas) remaining averaged priced. In this case,
competitiveness would increase in those geographic areas where «customer density» is higher
(extra-urban area). However, if this unbundling concerned both inputs (electricity and gas) there
would be no significant changes in DG economic viability. “Spatial” marginal costs of electricity
and gas distribution are in fact supplementary. Increasing the electricity prices in extra-urban areas
raises DG benefits. Nevertheless, these benefits would be partially compensated by increasing gas
distribution prices and vice-versa in the urban areas.
The problem of price combined effect helps us to introduce the other two potential sources of
distortions: inefficient pricing regulation and energy taxation.
Contrary to what we assume in this paper (no source of allocative efficiency), in the real world
prices might not reflect marginal costs of supply, and taxes rarely reflect external marginal costs.
This can favour or penalise distributed generation depending on the kind of distortion.
As regards price regulation, tariff structures could play an important role. For instance,
electricity two-part tariffs with high weight of the variable component (beyond the optimal
proportion) raise DG profitability and vice-versa in the case of gas distribution tariff. By simulating
the best  (electricity tariff totally variable and gas tariff totally fixed) and worst cases (electricity
tariff totally fixed and gas tariff totally variable), it is possible to demonstrate DG internal benefits
ranging from –8% to 4%.
As regards energy taxes, they obviously influence DG economic viability. High excise taxes on
electricity end-use, combined with low taxes on natural gas (for residential uses), increases DG
competitiveness and vice-versa in the opposite case. In this connection, it is interesting to simulate
what could happen in each European country. As figure 13 shows, Denmark is the only country
where energy taxation can considerably modify DG benefits because of the extremely high excise
tax on electricity compared to the tax on natural gas.
In conclusion, the framework described above supports the idea that the current enthusiasm over
distributed generation deployment is due to price inefficiencies. By unbundling services and prices,
market reforms can potentially increase DG private competitiveness. Nevertheless, in addition to
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other price inefficiencies, they can also introduce more serious sources of distortions that can push
DG deployment beyond the point legitimised by its real social value.
8. The role of incoming technological innovation: what can fuel cells hold for us in the
near future?
 Our analysis has focused on conventional small technologies (gas engine and gas turbine)
and offers a rather discouraging scenario for future DG development. In order to give a definitive
answer to the topical question posed in this paper, we need to reflect on what technological change
holds for us in the next few years. This compels us to analyse the specific case of the fuel cells. The
physical-chemical principle of fuel-cell operation is totally different from that of DG conventional
technologies. By means of the fuel cells, the chemical energy of the fuel is directly converted into
electricity without the intermediate step of thermal energy generation. This makes it possible to
achieve very high efficiency (in theory up to 80%) with a very low environmental impact (see table
A2 of the Appendix).
Figure 14 shows the overall range of social competitiveness of the fuel cells. This range was
obtained by comparing fuel cells to the heat pump in Milan and assuming that a large power plant
(CCGT) with 60% efficiency21 generates electricity for the centralised solution. Furthermore, as
capital costs represent the weak point of the fuel cells, we calculate their overall performance for
various levels of unit investment cost. Figure 14 shows a very surprising result. Even if we assumed
the same investment cost of the conventional technologies (around 500 USD/kW) the range of
social competitiveness would be quite limited. At best, might not exceed 20%. What is the reason of
this counterintuitive result?
Figure 14 – Fuel cells
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We attempt to answer this question by separately analysing internal and external cost
sensitivities to the plant efficiency variability. As we can see from Figure 14, up to a value of
efficiency around 30-40% (which is the typical range of efficiency of the conventional small
technologies), sensitivity is relatively high. Beyond this threshold, the marginal improvements due
to efficiency increase become considerably lower.
9. Conclusions
 This paper has attempted to measure the social value of distributed generation by comparing
decentralised solutions to large power supply. Despite the great uncertainty regarding external cost
estimations, the paper clearly demonstrates that centralised supply is still preferable to extensive
decentralisation. Rather, there is evidence in favour of increasing centralisation through the
deployment of the totally electric solution, the heat pump, which emerges as the best technology.
This overall result has allowed us to clearly answer the topical question this paper posed. In fact, it
clearly emerges that we are not moving towards a new paradigm of the network energy industry,
based on a wide decentralisation of energy supply, both in the short (conventional DG technologies)
and in the long term (fuel cells).
Given this unfavourable framework, we have tried to understand why operators, regulators and
legislators are so optimistic about DG development. Answering this question has required enlarging
our perspective by analysing the importance of market distortions and supporting environmental
policies.
Market power in power market, as well as inefficient price regulation and energy taxation, can
play a fundamental role in raising DG profitability beyond its real social value. In this sense, DG
deployment could be the sign of the failure of the energy market reforms and support the idea that
the traditional organisational model, based upon vertically and horizontally large firms and
hierarchic transactions, is still the industry social paradigm.
At the same time, too much emphasis on global environmental effects, and consequently on the
extent of energy saving, can distort the perception of the real environmental value of distributed
generation. This leads us to carefully reflect upon the potential ambiguity of environmental policies
which focus too much on reducing CO2 emissions and thus disregard the possible trade-off between
local-regional and global effects.
In conclusion, one needs to be prudent in supporting DG deployment. Small distributed plants
might be useful in mitigating market power, increasing system reliability and, in some
circumstances (i.e. renewable energy sources), they really improve environmental conditions.
Nevertheless, we should realise that, from the social welfare point of view, DG is only the third best
solution. Removing technical and economic barriers is welcomed but providing subsides must be
carefully evaluated.
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Appendix
 This appendix includes two sections. The first describes the technical data used in this paper.
The second describes the methodology set out to evaluate long-run marginal costs of electricity and
gas supplies.
 Basic data. This part of the appendix describes the technical and economic data used in this
paper. Tables from A1 to A6 report the value of the technical parameters and the unit investment
costs. Table A7 reports the value of the electricity and gas tariff components.  All components, both
fixed and variables, refer to average values in Italy calculated by elaborating data and information
provided by the Italian Energy Authority22 (Autorita’ per l’Energia Elettrica e il gas – AEEG).
Finally concerning )( kk HΦ  the following functions, typical of the Italian market, have been
adopted:
H
e eH ⋅−−=Φ 00052,01)(   for electricity and Hg eH ⋅−−=Φ 0016,01)(    for natural gas
Table A1 – Applications: capacity needs and energy consumption
Residential building
(Volume: 57,600 cm)
Hospital
(300 beds)
Milan Palermo Milan Palermo
Structural electricity need
Maximum capacity (kW) 270 270 2000 2000
Annual consumption MWh/y 788 788 13,140 13,140
Air conditioning need
Cool maximum capacity (kW) 1300 1420 9165 10,082
Annual consumption
(summer)
MWh/y 2340 2574 17,082 18,790
Space heating need
Maximum capacity (kW) 1006 603 7090 3757
Annual consumption (winter) MWh/y 1800 562 13,140 5256
Hot water for sanitary uses
Capacity (assumed constant) (kW) 55 55 500 500
Annual consumption MWh/y 482 482 4380 4380
Table A2 – Power technologies: electrical efficiency and emission rate
Efficiency Emission rate(1)
CO2eq SOx NOx PM10
% (g/kWh) (g/MWh) (g/MWh) (g/MWh)
Gas engine 40 452.8 2.5 897.8 12.3
Gas turbine 30 611.0 2.5 469.3 32.4
Fuel cell (MCFC) 54 371.0 2.4 16.1 0.0
CCGT 51 352.3 1.8 27.3 18.2
(1)Per unit of electricity generated
Sources: European Commission (1997b); Regulatory Assistance Project (2001)
                                                          
22
 See Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002)
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Table A3 – Applications: plant sizes
Residential building in Milan
A B C1 C2 D1 D2
Plant typology CB+CR HP CHP + AR   CHP+HP+AR
Plant size Power generation (CHP) 1200 1035 661 619
(kW) Absorbing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 1300 1300 694 760
Compressing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 1300 1328 782 730
Conv. boiler – space heating (Fuel cap.) 1117
Convent. Boiler. – hot water (Fuel cap.) 61
Condens. Boiler – hot water (Fuel cap.) 50
Hospital in Milan
Plant size Power generation (CHP) 8547 7364 4753 4439
(kW) Absorbing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 9165 9165 4897 5384
Compressing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 9165 10,100 5571 5193
Conv. boiler – space heating (Fuel cap.) 7878
Convent. Boiler. – hot water (Fuel cap.) 556
Condens. Boiler – hot water (Fuel cap.) 459
Residential Building in Palermo
Plant size Power generation (CHP) 1315 1136 710 664
(kW) Absorbing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 1430 1430 887 819
Compressing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 1430 1430 854 802
Conv. boiler – space heating (Fuel cap.) 670
Convent. Boiler. – hot water (Fuel cap.) 71
Condens. Boiler – hot water (Fuel cap.) 50
Hospital in Palermo
Plant size Power generation (CHP)
(kW) Absorbing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 9361 8072 5096 4764
Compressing refrigerator (Cool cap.) 10,082 10,082 5283 5797
Conv. boiler – space heating (Fuel cap.) 10,082 10,082
Convent. Boiler. – hot water (Fuel cap.) 4174
Condens. Boiler – hot water (Fuel cap.) 556 459
CB: conventional boiler; CR: compressing refrigerator; HP: electrical heat pump; AR: absorbing refrigerator; CHP: combined heat
and power plant, TG: large turbine gas (for centralised peak generation).
Source: Bruzzi (2002)
Tab. A4 – Investment costs(1) (USD 01/kW)
Residential Hospital
A B C1 C2 D1 D2 A B C1 C2 D1 D2
CB 23 14
CR 280 230
HP 370 370 370 320 320 320
AR 200 200 200 200 137 137 137 137
CHP 460 500 460 500 410 460 410 460
TG 270
(1) Per unit of output; Note: TG: large turbine gas (for centralised peak generation).
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 Long run marginal costs. The demand for public utility service varies not only periodically
over the month and year, but also varies significantly on a daily or weekly basis. Public utilities
have been concerned for nearly a century with this peaking demand. The problem of meeting these
variations in load with some optimum sized plant capacity and the accompanying investments and
costs, all in the framework of a pricing structure, is called the peak load pricing problem.
In this appendix we propose an alternative methodology for dealing with the problem of the
peak load pricing. Instead of resolving the problem of consumer’s surplus we directly calculate the
long run marginal cost of delivering a new customer. For this purpose we proceed as follows.
Suppose an utility faces a capacity demand curve )(HP  which describes the classical monotone
curve with H the number of hours of the year in which the capacity demand is higher then P . Let
HvfHc iii +=)(  be the annual cost of deliver a unit of capacity and 1Γ , 2Γ  and 3Γ  the best
available technologies with 321 fff <<  and 321 vvv >> . From figure A1 it follows that the
minimum cost C  of covering )(HP  will be:
(A1)
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Assume now that the utility supplies a new customer with a demand profile
)()()( HPHPHP −=∆ where )(HP is the new monotone curve. From figure A1 it follows that the
minimum cost of covering )(HP will be
(A2)
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Given equations A1 and A2 and the marginal cost will be:
(A3) ∫∫∫ ∆⋅+∆⋅+∆⋅+
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Now, as )/()( 21121 vvffH −−= , )/()( 32232 vvffH −−= and )()()( HPHPHP −=∆ , for the case
of n technologies we have:
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Figure A1 – Load monotone curve and technology costs
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